




The Internet of Things (IoT), comprising a plethora of heterogeneous devices, is an enabling technology that can 
improve the quality of our daily lives, for instance by measuring parameters from the environment (e.g., humidity, 
temperature, weather, energy consumption, traffic, and others) or our bodies (e.g., health data). However, as with 
any technology, IoT has introduced a number of security and privacy challenges. Indeed, IoT devices create, process, 
transfer and store data, which are often sensitive, and which must be protected from unauthorized access. Similarly, 
the infrastructure that links with IoT, as well as the IoT devices themselves, is an asset that needs to be protected. 
The focus of this work is examining authentication in IoT. In particular, in this work we conducted a state-of-the-
art review of the access control models that have been proposed, including both traditional access control models 
and emerging models that have recently been proposed and are tailored for IoT. We identified that the existing 
models cannot cope with indeterminacy, an inherent characteristic of IoT, which hinders authentication decisions. 
In this context, we studied the two known components of indeterminacy, i.e., uncertainty and ambiguity, and 
proposed a new model that handles indeterminacy in authentication in IoT environments. 
 
Index Terms – Internet of Things, Authentication, Uncertainty, Ambiguity, Access Control 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Today, IoT, with more than 20 billion connected devices, introduces new security and privacy 
concerns. IoT is scaling up horizontally by expanding forms of data communication ranging from 
human-to-machine to machine-to-machine networks. It is also growing vertically by extending the 
capacity of resources and integrating more and more platforms and networks to form a heterogeneous 
environment. Most of the known IoT challenges have been investigated in areas such as smart cities, 
smart grids and e-health [1], [2], [3]. Among the challenges studied in the literature, access control 
was introduced as an open challenge that needs more investigation [4]. This is because governing 
access to big data produced by billions of smart devices needs a resilient, robust and real-time access 
control method. Furthermore, a number of IoT’s inherent characteristics, such as scalability, 
heterogeneity, dynamism and resource sharing, amplify the security concerns related to access 
control. Scalability speeds up the velocity of data produced by Internet-enabled entities and similarly 
increases the variety of data sources that together leads to an increase in volume of the data produced. 
Integrating different platforms, networks and technologies such as WSN, RFID and GSM into a 









Mohammad Heydari,1 Alexios Mylonas,2 Vahid Heydari Fami Tafreshi,3 Elhadj Benkhelifa,4 Surjit 
Singh5 
 1,2 Cyber Security Research Group, Bournemouth University  
3,4School of Computing and Digital Technologies, Staffordshire University 
5 Department of Computer Engineering, National Institute of Technology, Kurukshetra, India  
Known Unknowns: Indeterminacy in 




In such a heterogeneous environment, not only is achieving a secure and seamless integration of 
different platforms a challenge, but data access control also becomes more cumbersome. Dynamism 
in IoT stems from the need for real-time access to interconnected things in which interactions require 
fast responses at suitable times. For this purpose, access control and any context-aware services are 
directly influenced. Resource sharing in IoT improves performance with minimum investment. 
However, it comes with the risk of insider threats and permission misuses. Data communication loss 
in the event of a network or device failure is inevitable, and this might render the data in IoT 
inaccurate or incomplete. The incompleteness and imprecision inherent in the above-mentioned 
contexts can hinder precise access control decisions.  
The main focus of this work is on “indeterminacy” as a new and unseen obstacle to securing IoT. 
It has a direct impact on the authentication phase of access control. Indeterminacy plays a crucial 
role in IoT when there is a need to make an informed access decisions based on incomplete or 
inaccurate information. In other words, indeterminacy appears when the access control mechanism 
needs to decide whether or not an entity is authenticated on the basis of with insufficient or inaccurate 
information, If indeterminacy is considered in this case, then this can lead to more precise decision-
making when access is granted to different IoT devices and parties.  
Some of the aforementioned characteristics of IoT complicate indeterminacy in data access 
scenarios. In particular, dynamism may exaggerate challenges in indeterminate access scenarios. In 
order to handle dynamism in access control, real-time activities and changes in the system need to 
be monitored. The inability to track these changes leads to a state of access decision-making that we 
describe as an “indeterminate state”. Moreover, delay and latency caused by network deliveries in a 
heterogeneous environment may cause the same issue – that is, insufficient information to make 
informed access decisions. 
The main aim of this work is to survey access control in IoT with a particular focus on 
indeterminacy. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses access control in 
IoT and presents the suitability of current access control models, protocols, standards and language 
for IoT. The concept of indeterminacy in authentication will be introduced in Section 3. The proposed 
model to handle indeterminacy in authentication will be presented in Section 4. The paper concludes 
in Section 5. 
II. ACCESS CONTROL IN IOT 
Access control is a mechanism that determines the precise level of access to system resources 
based on a policy. It consists of authentication, authorization and auditing functions. The focus of 
this work is on authentication. In relation to access control, a number of characteristics have been 





weight, heterogeneity and context-awareness [5]. According to the inherent characteristics of IoT, an 
access control system can be evaluated by the following criteria [6]: 
1. Scalability: The authentication method must be scalable in three different dimensions: a) 
subject/object (entities): the performance (in terms of processing time or workload) of a scalable 
authentication method is not increased by the number of entities; b) policy rules: if the number 
of access policy rules increases it does not result in overhead; and c) extensibility: the ability of 
the structure to expand is important for the authentication method in the context of a 
heterogeneous environment such as IoT. Extensibility can be achieved through a decentralized 
architecture to cover different subsystems and domains. 
2. Heterogeneity/Interoperability: An IoT-based authentication method must be applicable to 
different domains and platforms to cope with the heterogeneity of the IoT environment. In order 
to be thus applicable, the method must consider dependencies among entities and their 
workflows. Governing the authentication process in such an environment can be more 
challenging than in the traditional environment because of these dependencies. 
3. Dynamism: If the values of the environmental attributes change while the subject is being 
authenticated then the granted access must be revoked. IoT needs a dynamic authentication 
method because of the rapid changes that can happen to the values of contextual attributes in 
such an environment. 
4. Context-Awareness: In order to bring flexibility into access decisions, an authentication 
method must consider changes in contextual attributes to make more precise access decisions. It 
should be able to monitor the subject, object and environmental changes if these changes have 
impacts on the access decision.  
 





Figure 1 depicts the classification of access control models, methods, protocols and language. In 
the rest of this section, the building blocks of this classification are analyzed based on the above-
mentioned criteria in order to investigate whether they are applicable to IoT.  
A. Access Control Models 
Several access control models have been proposed since Lampson’s access matrix was introduced in 
the late 1960s. According to [7], Discretionary Access Control (DAC), Mandatory Access Control 
(MAC), Bell-LaPadula (BLP), Biba, Clark-Wilson, Chinese Wall, Capability-Based Access Control 
(CapBAC) and Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) have been classified as traditional access control 
models. We refer to Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC), and other models such as Access 
Control Based on Usage Control (UCON) and Organizational-Based Access Control (OrBAC), as 
emerging access control models. According to the above-mentioned criteria for evaluating access 
control systems, neither traditional nor emerging access control systems are applicable to IoT. Table 
1 shows the performance of the access control models against four evaluation criteria in detail [6]. 
 
Table 1: Evaluation of traditional and emerging access control models 
 
 
Table 2 summarized a number of proposed access control models that are based on an extension 
of the models listed in Table 1. The proposed methods have tried to address the limitations of the 
reference models stated in Table 1. Jindou et al. [8] proposed an access control model based on 
RBAC for the Web of Things (WoT). This model gathers information from users’ profiles on social 




trust and privacy challenges for all participants in the access control model. Barka et al. [9] integrated 
RBAC and WoT to build an access control model with a centralized architecture. Access decisions 
are made by the Access Control Decision Facility (ACDF) based on an RBAC policy. Because of its 
centralized structure, the model cannot cope with a distributed environment such as WoT. Jing Liu 
et al. [10] have adapted the RBAC model to IoT using the Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC). In 
this method, IoT devices should be registered to a nearby trustworthy access point or gateway (termed 
as a Registration Authority). Furthermore, the authentication protocol suggested in this method is 
based on OpenID protocol, so it cannot be adaptable to IoT. Finally, it is not clear how the method 
identifies roles and assigns them, and nor has the work considered how RBAC can be adapted in the 
context of IoT.  
Waleed et al. [11] proposed an access control model based on ABAC that incorporates trust and 
privacy into access policy to make it reliable in a collaborative environment. This model supports 
the privacy of subjects by authorizing certain access requests so that the purposes of access for both 
the subject and the object are the same. The limitations of the method include the following: a) if the 
contextual parameters have changed during the access time, the access decision nonetheless remains 
the same, and b) the proposed approach cannot be applied to distributed architecture, including P2P 
platforms. Kaiwen et al. [12] proposed a hybrid access control model based on RBAC and ABAC 
that can resolve the large-scale dynamic problem of IoT users. This model pre-assigns roles for 
entities (nodes/users) based on their property expressions. The model also presents a property rule 
policy language and a solution to the conflict with the redundancy policy. The authors in [13] used 
the WeChat App to illustrate the feasibility of this model. This model simplifies the complexity of 
traditional ABAC in right allocation and policy management. However, it cannot deal with policy 
conflict or redundancy processing as the model still needs the administrator to manage roles and 
access policy. Harsha, S., et al. [14] proposed an access control method based on ABAC for use in 
healthcare. The focus of this work is on providing both multilevel controlled access delegation and 
on-demand attribute revocation. The authors in [14] suggested using assignment tokens and digital 
signatures to handle delegation and revocation. The complexity of using the token-based approach 
in conjunction with ABAC was not investigated by the authors. Furthermore, the structure of token 
distribution and the validation scheme was not tested against forged intra-domain authorities, which 
may issue fake attributes and tokens. 
Guoping et al. [15] proposed a method based on the extension of UCON. This method governs 
access by evaluating the degree of trust in the subject against the degree of trust of the object and the 
environment. If the trust value of the subject is in the range of the determined threshold for the 
requested object, then the access will be granted. The authors showed that their model works 
theoretically, but it is unclear whether it can work in a real-world scenario. Anggorojati et al. [16] 




this model, context information was added to CapBAC as a new dimension. This method has used 
the concept of the federation in the Web for IoT by mapping identity to “thing”. Mahalle [17] 
proposed a novel method for authentication and access control based on the approach proposed by 
[18]. In this method, verification of communication is done via its capability access. In other words, 
if any entity wants to communicate with another entity, communication is established after verifying 
the capability of the requesting entity. The proposed model uses a public key approach and is 
compatible with the lightweight, mobile, distributed and computationally limited nature of IoT. In 
this work, scalability, granularity and delegation were introduced as the main advantages of this 
method but the computational overhead of applying the model was not examined. Moreover, the 
interoperability of the proposed method in a heterogeneous environment such as IoT is still 
recognized as an open challenge. Gusmeroli et al. [19] proposed another model based on CapBAC, 
which uses a centralized approach for governing access control. The bottleneck for this method is 
that the majority of IoT devices have constrained resources and the overhead of the proposed method 
was not studied in this work. Yeh et al. [20] proposed a CapBAC-oriented access control framework 
for the e-healthcare domain. This method supports both fine-grained access control and revocation. 
The execution time for the encryption algorithms included in this method was compared with similar 
work to show its efficiency in terms of computational complexity. Although the proposed approach 
was proved theoretically, no experiment was conducted to show its efficiency in practice.  
Li et al. [21] proposed a method that permits a user in a domain (e.g., smart city, smart grid) to 
send a message to a sensor in a domain that uses identity-based cryptography. The most important 
characteristic of this method is that it supports communication between heterogeneous environments. 
Furthermore, authors in [21] showed that the computational cost of the sensor node in their method 
is reduced and energy consumption is consequently reduced. Patel et al. [22] proposed an energy-
efficient access control method for IoT using elliptic-curve cryptography. The proposed method was 
evaluated using the AVISPA1 tool against attacks such as man-in-the-middle, reply attack and DoS. 
Even though the proposed method mitigated all these attacks successfully, one limitation of this work 
is that the method’s efficiency was not considered. Ouaddah et al. [23] proposed a model based on 
an extension of OrBAC, which focuses on low power consumption. To meet this goal, part of the 
processing burden of PDP was transferred to end-point devices to make the centralized structure 
more flexible. However, the overhead of the proposed method in terms of computational complexity 
and energy consumption was not proven experimentally. Moreover, the interoperability of the 
proposed scheme has not been studied. Sciancalepore et al. [24] proposed an access control 
framework based on OAuth 2.0, which consists of a wireless sensor network, client, gateway and 
authorization server. The authorization server passes the access request to the resource owner and 
generates the access token for the subject to which the access is granted. One of the challenges in 
 




this method is that direct communication between entities (without the presence of a gateway) is not 
possible due to the role of the gateway. The following conclusions arise from the study of the 
literature: 
 
• In the approaches designed as an extension of RBAC, scalabilty in IoT was studied. Morever, the 
interoperability issue was addressed through a Web-based interface (WoT).  
 
• CapBAC-based approaches, even those using lightweight encryption algorithms (e.g., ECC), 
suffer from computational overhead in a scalable environment (e.g., cloud, IoT). Morever, 
applying certificate-based authentication brings new challenges in terms of certificate validation 
and management in a heterogeneous environment such as IoT. In other words, moving from one 
domain to another makes interoperability a major concern for certificate validation. 
 
• Although ABAC-based approaches bring flexibility by considering contexual parameters, 
managing a number of attributes in a hybrid model using role assignment by RBAC or by using 
public-key encryption like Attribute-based Encryption (ABE) introduce overhead and 
interoperability issues in IoT. 
 






B. Access Control Protocols and Standards 
This subsection first introduces the most widely used access control standards and protocols, 
followed by a discussion of their applicability in IoT. In order to evaluate the protocols involved in 
access control the following criteria that are proposed in RFC 2989 and RFC 4962 are used: 
1. Overhead: IoT devices are resource-constrained and thus any proposed access control protocol for 
IoT must be lightweight. To evaluate overhead, two different parameters are considered: a) 
communication overhead, which can be measured by the number of messages exchanged in a data 
access scenario per access request; and b) the lightness of data exchange format, which affects 
the amount of required control traffic per access. Increased overhead may result in increased 
power consumption. For this reason, some works have suggested using more efficient protocols 
than WiFi RF for communicating over IoT, such as LoRA [25]. Poursafar et al. [26] compared 
short-range and long-range enabling technologies involved in IoT. The writers presented a new 
classification for low-power wide-area networks which are introduced as an efficient and 
promising technology in IoT.   
2. Security of data-in-transit: The confidentiality of credentials that are sent over the network should 
be ensured. Otherwise, the protocol is prone to breaches of confidentiality of (credential) data-in-
transit.  
3. Architecture: The structure of access control protocols can be centralized or decentralized. As 
services in the IoT environment are decentralized and distributed, centralized architecture for 
access control protocol does not work efficiently if the protocol is deployed in a heterogeneous 
environment.  
 
The aforementioned criteria will be used to evaluate whether the following protocols fit IoT: i) 
Open Authorization (OAuth),2 an open protocol used to establish a secure authorization over the Web; 
ii) OpenID,3 a Web-oriented single sign-on protocol that is widely used by well-known companies 
such as PayPal and Amazon; iii) Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML), an XML-oriented 
and open protocol to exchange user authentication and authorization data among security domains; 
iv) Remote Authentication Dial-in User Service (RADIUS),4 an authentication network protocol that 
works in client/server network architecture to provide centralized access to networks (RFC 6929); v) 
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP),5 which is a centralized and remote authentication 
network protocol used for authentication and authorization; and vi) Kerberos,6 a network 
authentication protocol developed by MIT to provide access to university resources in the 1980s by 










used in active directory and database access for access control.  
In addition to the above de facto protocols, a number of studies have suggested new protocols.  
Braeken et al. [27] proposed a key agreement scheme based on symmetric encryption for IoT. The 
approach handles the verification of authentication for communications in which entities do not have 
prior trust relations.  
These protocols suffer from vulnerabilities. Jurcut et al. [28] proposed an approach to detect 
exploitable vulnerabilities in authentication protocols. The proposed method used a novel logic-
based technique to describe the circumstances under which a weakness in authentication protocols 
can be exploited. 
A number of papers in the literature have proposed applying Blockchain technology to provide 
secure access in IoT. Zoubir Ourad et al. [29] suggested applying Ethereum smart contracts in IoT 
domains. The evaluation results indicated that the proposed solution benefits from a number of 
advantages including scalability, decentralization and integrity in comparison with OAuth 2.0.  
Table 3 summarizes the comparative study between the above-mentioned authentication protocols 
based on the aggregated attributes that were discussed in the literature. 
 
 
Table 3: Summary of widely deployed authentication protocols 
 
Spec OAuth OpenID SAML RADIUS LDAP Kerberos 
Authentication No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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C. Access Control Language  
Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) is a de facto standard and language to 
express ABAC-based access control policies, which is based on XML and developed by OASIS.7 It 
uses policy language to define access policies and request/response language to describe access 
request queries and responses. According to the findings of this research, XACML has the following 
advantages in modelling: i) XACML is a standard that has been reviewed by a wide community of 
experts and users; ii) it offers a comprehensive framework to build policies and provides an 
expressive language that supports a diverse collection of data types, functions and combining 
algorithms that can be easily extended; iii) XACML is sufficiently generic to be deployed in any 
environment – it makes policy management easier; and iv) it can be utilized in distributed contexts, 
which means that a policy can refer to other policies. In other words, XACML can combine results 
from different policies into a single decision. 
 
D. Resilient Access Control Approaches 
Traditional access control approaches operate based on a set of static policy rules that govern 
access. In these approaches, access is granted if the corresponding rules are fired. Each rule consists 
of parameters to handle a condition in the predicted access scenario. The values of these parameters 
should be available if the rule needs to be fired. In such a system, if some of the rule parameters are 
missing then the system cannot handle the access scenario. As discussed earlier, scalable and 
heterogeneous environments such as IoT consist of data access scenarios in which making access 
decisions (e.g., authentication) based on the available information is not feasible due to a lack of 
information. In such a non-resilient access control system, the output leads to the access request being 
rejected. Therefore, a new paradigm is needed to make precise access decisions based on incomplete 
information and bring resilience to access decision-making. This type of access control is called 
“resilient access control”. Three paradigms have been proposed to achieve this goal [30], [31]: (i) 
Break-The-Glass (BTG) Access Control; (ii) Optimistic Access Control; and (iii) Risk-Aware Access 
Control (RAAC). 
 
1. Break-The-Glass Access Control (BTG) 
 
Ferreira [32] suggested BTG to allow access rule overrides. The aim of this model is to allow 






[27]. Scalability is the most important challenge of BTG because growing the number of access rules 
overriding the access means that governing and auditing become impossible [33].  
 
2. Optimistic Access Control 
 
Optimistic Access Control was proposed to provide access in emergency scenarios (e.g., e-
healthcare) in which availability is needed more than confidentiality. The optimistic paradigm 
assumes that most access requests will be authentic, and it allows subjects to exceed their normal 
permissions. In such a system, adopting an extra control layer to protect the resources from misuse 





3. Risk-Aware Access Control (RAAC) 
 
RAAC was proposed to evaluate the risk of the access request to determine whether access to a 
resource should be granted [34]. RAAC includes the process of risk assessment, which is defined as 
the process of identifying, estimating and prioritizing risks to organizational assets and operations 
(NIST SP-800). It enables the resource owner to obtain a view of existing security risks and their 
impacts. Three taxonomies were proposed for risk assessment [35], [36]:  
 
• The most recent taxonomy classifies risk assessment based on the level of analysis into three 
categories: i) asset-driven, in which the assessment starts by identifying and evaluating the assets; 
ii) service-driven, in which the services are identified first and then risks associated with these 
services are evaluated; and iii) business-driven, in which business goals and associated processes 
should be identified first and then the risks related to these business goals are assessed.  
• Another taxonomy for risk assessment methods is based on risk measurement. Risk-measuring 
methods fall into two categories: i) non-propagated, where risk is measured regardless of its 
propagation impacts on the other risk parameters; and ii) propagated, where dependencies among 
the resources and their impacts on each other are taken into consideration to measure the risk. 
• Risk-aware access control methods can be classified into two categories: non-adaptive RAAC and 
adaptive RAAC. Non-adaptive RAAC refers to the class of methods in which even when the values 
of risk factors changed the calculated risk value remains unchanged, and therefore non-adaptive 
RAAC is not sensitive to changes in the parameters involved in the access scenario. In contrast, 




the risk factors. Therefore, tracking of activities and monitoring of situational parameters are vital 
in adaptive RAAC in order to reflect the changes and make the necessary change to granted access. 
• In order to measure the value of the risk, in the literature a number of metrics are suggested, 
including object sensitivity, the severity of the requested action and the benefit of the access [37], 
[38]. Moreover, five different methods were suggested for calculating the total value of the risk, 
and these were discussed in [6]. These classes take into consideration different parameters such as 
the likelihood of incident, the likelihood of threat, and the impact of the threat or incident. 
 
E. Finding on RAAC Approaches 
There are a number of widely used standards and methodologies for risk assessment, such as NIST-
SP800,8 ISO/IEC 27005:20119 and IEC 62443-2-1.10 Each describes a specific method for risk 
identification, evaluation, prioritization and mitigation. The adaptability of these risk assessment 
standards and methodologies in the IoT environment is controversial. Nurse et al. [39] argued that if 
IoT-related characteristics, such as scalability, heterogeneity and dynamism, are taken into 
consideration’, the current risk assessment approaches are inadequate for IoT for the following 
reasons: 
• Limitation of periodic assessment for the IoT environment: The current risk-based approaches are 
based on periodic assessment and therefore cannot identify and evaluate significant changes in a 
highly dynamic system such as IoT, where there is a high degree of variability in system scale, 
dynamism and coupling. 
• Lack of knowledge of IoT entities: Most of the current risk assessment approaches are based on 
knowledge of assets, threats, attack probabilities and potential impacts of threats. However, 
achieving sufficient knowledge of these parameters in IoT is extremely challenging due to the 
scalable and dependable environment of IoT.  
• Interoperability and dependency challenges: Current risk assessment approaches are unable to 
assess all the processes associated with the assets and the inter/intra-connections that allow them 
to couple and operate.   
One of the big challenges for most existing RAAC methods is that they are manual [40]. Those 
RAAC methods that rely on a low degree of automation are not applicable in a scalable and 
heterogeneous environment such as IoT because the cost of the manual RAAC process in terms of 
time and money would be high and the whole process would be error-prone because of human 
intervention. Furthermore, existing RAAC approaches suffer from vulnerabilities that lead to social 








affect their generalizability and make them domain-specific solutions rather than generic methods 
[41]. 
III. INDETERMINACY IN AUTHENTICATION 
Indeterminacy has not received the attention that it deserves as a challenge in IoT, compared to 
other challenges that are well-studied in the relevant literature, such as scalability, heterogeneity, 
interoperability and dynamism [1], [2], [3], [42], [43]. However, as this work stresses, indeterminacy 
should be considered when making an access control decision in IoT. Otherwise, if the decision is 
based on deterministic rules regardless of the indeterminacy concept, this leads to a binary decision 
(Access/Deny), which does not fit in a dynamic environment such as IoT.  
According to [44], there are at least two facets of indeterminacy: uncertainty and ambiguity. In the 
context of authentication, we consider that uncertainty is caused by a lack of information about the 
likelihood of an incident occurring. Also, ambiguity is caused by a lack of precision in the 
information required to make a decision. In the rest of this section, uncertainty and ambiguity in 
access control are discussed. 
 
A. Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is rooted in randomness. Randomness has traditionally been used to describe 
probabilistic events. The term uncertainty was coined by Knight in 1921 and appeared in Keynes’s 
writings in 1936 [45]. Uncertainty refers to a situation in which it is not certain that an event will 
occur. Uncertainty is classified into three categories [46]: 
 
i) Aleatory uncertainty concerns purely random events. Accurate prediction about random events is 
not achievable.  
 
ii) Epistemic uncertainty describes events with unknown parameters and properties of their 
occurrence. Most of the uncertainty found in IoT belongs to this category. 
 
iii) Inconsistent uncertainty refers to a situation in which the information available about the 
occurrence of an event is inconsistent. Gathering more information about the event leads to more 
conflicting testimonies.  
 
Historically, the concept of uncertainty came from economics (e.g., risk management, stock market 
forecasting) and management (decision-making) into computer science and is used to describe 
situations in which prediction of future events is not possible. Learning how to handle uncertainty in 




unpredicted scenarios. In order to handle uncertainty, five main theories have been proposed: i) 
probability theory; ii) information theory; iii) evidence theory [47]; iv) possibility theory [48]; and 
v) uncertainty theory [49].  
We summarize below the strengths and limitations of these theories in handling uncertainty:  
• Probability theory: Using subjective probability to model uncertainty is too narrow and leads to 
poor predictions, particularly in cases where aleatory uncertainty is mixed with epistemic 
uncertainty. 
• Information theory: The performance of entropy analysis depends on the probabilistic model used. 
If a poor model has been used, the outcome of such an analysis will not be reliable. 
• Evidence theory: This theory has the ability to aggregate multiple sources of uncertainty, so it 
works for inconsistent uncertainty. This theory has the same limitation as subjective probability 
theory in handling uncertainty when aleatory uncertainty is mixed with epistemic uncertainty. 
• Possibility theory: Possibility theory uses fuzzy measures to represent uncertainty. It needs fewer 
arbitrary assumptions than probability theory. It makes more precise predictions than subjective 
probability. When using this theory, empirical information is not needed to make a prediction. 
• Uncertainty theory: This is a relatively new theory in the field of uncertainty representation. It is 
suitable when too few samples are available, so this theory is the main competitor to possibility 
theory. The main difference between uncertainty theory and probability theory is that in probability 
theory the product probability measure is the product of the probability measures of the individual 
events, whereas in uncertainty theory the product uncertainty measure is the lowest of the 
uncertainty measures of the individual events. 
 
Making accurate authentication decisions based on incomplete information brings flexibility into 
the access control domain. As a result, uncertainty in authentication needs to be defined. As we 
previously defined it [6], uncertainty in authentication can be defined as a state in which access 
decisions have to be made based on incomplete information. There are a number of domains in which 
such a resilient method can be applied, such as vehicle-to-vehicle communication (VANET), virtual 
organization (VO) in smart grids, and resource sharing (e.g., traffic information) in smart cities. Such 
uncertainty is measured by calculating the probability of whether authenticating a subject will result 
in a security incident. In the world of security, “risk” is the concept most similar to “uncertainty”. 
These two concepts have “the likelihood of event occurrence” in common. In order to handle the 
risk, the impact of the event in question needs to be considered as well. Moreover, risk leads to 







One of the goals of this research was to identify the differences between uncertainty and ambiguity 
in authentication domains because these two concepts are used interchangeably in the literature [50], 
[51]. Consequently, the methods proposed to handle them are used interchangeably too. The term 
“ambiguity” was coined by Aristotle and referred to vagueness. Ambiguity is caused by imprecise 
information rather than incomplete information. Ambiguity in authentication is a state in which 
prediction of the trustworthiness of the subject fails as a result of imprecise or vague information. 
None of the theories mentioned that can be applied in uncertainty domains are able to give predictions 
on the future of the subject based on imprecise information. The sources of ambiguity may vary but 
the complexity of a system amplifies ambiguity [52]. As defined in [6], ambiguity in authentication 
is caused by a lack of precision in the available information about the subject who sends the 
authentication request. In order to handle ambiguity, it is necessary to determine to what extent the 
authentication system can trust the subject. In the attempt to do so, a number of attributes have been 
suggested in the literature, such as the profile history of the subject, and subject and object sensitivity. 
Applying soft computing methods such as fuzzy logic has been suggested to address the problem. 
 
C. Proposed Methods to Handle Risk and Trust 
A state-of-the-art review was conducted to answer the following research question: Can resilient 
access control methods handle indeterminacy in IoT? Table 4 summarizes the reviewed literature on 
resilient methods and indicates whether the existing approaches handle uncertainty and ambiguity. 
Bijon et al. [53] incorporated the concept of risk awareness into RBAC. In the proposed method the 
role of the subjects is assigned and activated based on the calculated risk. In this way, the total value 
for risk is calculated for all active roles assigned to the subject and if this value does not exceed the 
threshold the new role will be assigned. 
Baracaldo et al. [54], [55] used trust and risk concepts in relation to RBAC to deal with insiders. 
In this method, the trust value is calculated for each user. Moreover, the risk value is calculated and 
assigned to each role by considering all direct and indirect access rights that are enabled by activating 
such a role. Furthermore, a role is activated if the user meets the minimum trust level required for 
that role. The value of the trust is determined based on the amount of risk exposed by activating the 
role. Dimmock et al. [56] proposed a method to enhance the RBAC with trust and risk. To meet this 
goal, trust and cost evaluation measures are added to the OASIS policy language. This method has 
introduced a risk evaluation expression language to calculate the risk based on the given values and 
make an access decision based on that calculation. Chen et al. [57] proposed an extension for the 
RBAC model to handle the risk by calculating the likelihood of the occurrence and mitigating the 




for a role and assessing the trustworthiness of the subjects. The latter was handled by obligating the 
users to avoid accepting any request with a risk value greater than the threshold.  
Dos Santos et al. [58] proposed an RAAC approach based on the extension of ABAC for the cloud. 
Identifying the cloud federations for the subject and for the object is the major part of this method. 
If the cloud federations for the subject and for the object are the same then ABAC policy is applied, 
but if the federations are not the same then a risk assessment should be done for the subject to 
determine whether the overall risk for the subject is less than the threshold for granting access. Dos 
Santos et al. improved their approach [59] proposed in 2014 and enriched their method by applying 
RAAC not only for intra-cloud access decisions but also for inter-cloud access decisions.  Ricardo et 
al. [60] proposed a risk-aware framework to enforce RAAC policies in the cloud. This work is based 
on the extension of XACML and aggregates various risk factors to calculate the final value of the 
risk. Risk itself is measured based on the impact that access can cause. The calculated value is 
compared to a threshold to make an access decision. Atlam et al. [61] developed an adaptive RAAC 
model for IoT. This model accepts real-time attributes including user context, resource sensitivity, 
action severity and risk history as inputs and estimates the overall risk value associated with each 
access request. A limitation of this work is that the authors did not validate their proposed model. 
Dorri N. et al. [62] proposed an access control framework for grid environments to address the misuse 
of resources in virtual organizations. This method offers both risk and trust analysis in authorization 
to assess the subject’s actions. In order to measure the degree of trust for the users the proposed 
method uses feedback by applying the probabilistic approach. In addition to trust, the method 
assesses the risk based on the calculated value of trust. The proposed risk model predicts the 
likelihood of fulfilment of obligations. The proposed model was evaluated using simulation, which 
proved its scalability in terms of the number of entities, the number of policy rules and the degree of 
extensibility. 





IV. PROPOSED MODEL 
The model shown in Figure 2 is proposed to handle uncertainty and ambiguity in the authentication 
phase of the access control. The architecture of the model is based on XACML. The reasons for 
selecting XACML are that the proposed model is based on ABAC and works with contextual 
parameters as attributes. XACML is the standard (and language) for ABAC.  
 
 
Figure 2: Proposed architecture for the indeterminacy-aware authentication model 
 
As depicted in Figure 2, the data flow model is as follows:  
1) A subject sends its authentication request to Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). PEP is the 
interface between the system and the subject to forward its request and return the decision in terms 
of obligations.  
2) PEP sends the request to Policy Decision Point (PDP), which is responsible for gathering policy 
related to the specified resource from Policy Administration Point (PAP).  
3) PDP requests policy from PAP. 
4) PAP is responsible to provide requested policy to PDP.  
5) PDP also requests subject, object and environment attributes related to the request from Policy 
Information Point (PIP).  
6) PIP is responsible to gather attributes related to the request (subject, object, environment) and 
makes it available to PDP.   
7) By having requested information, PDP sends the access request to Indeterminacy Estimation 
Point (IEP) for requesting both uncertainty-aware and ambiguity-aware engines to calculate the 
uncertainty and ambiguity values associated to the authentication request.  
8) IEP sends request to uncertainty-aware engine to calculate the total value of the uncertainty 




9) Uncertainty engine return the calculated value to IEP.  
10) IEP sends request to ambiguity-aware engine to calculate the ambiguity value (trust value) 
associated with the authentication request.  
11) Ambiguity-aware engine returns the calculated value for the trust.  
12) IEP calculates the value of indeterminacy based on the risk and trust values and sends it to 
PDP.  
13) PDP makes final access decision using related policy and the value of indeterminacy which 
was provided by IEP. Then the decision will be forwarded to PEP.  
14) PEP fulfills the obligations based on the authentication decision. 
V. CONCLUSION 
With the advent of IoT, the concept of resilient access control has gained considerable attention 
and pushed the limits of the conventional access control approaches. In this paper, we have analysed 
both traditional and emerging access control models in order to investigate whether they fit IoT. Our 
work indicates that the conventional models do not fit into IoT because of their lack of support for 
its inherent characteristics, such as scalability, heterogeneity and dynamism. Moreover, we have 
surveyed the resilient access control approaches to evaluate them against the criteria discussed, and 
our work has revealed the same drawbacks in terms of scalability, heterogeneity and dynamism. This 
work also focuses on “indeterminacy” as a challenge that is neglected in comparison with other 
challenges to access control in IoT. In this way, we have defined indeterminacy in authentication, 
which includes uncertainty and ambiguity in authentication. We have also surveyed the relevant 
literature that handles indeterminacy in authentication. Finally, we have proposed an indeterminacy-
aware authentication model based on the extension of ABAC. Future research directions could 
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